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A COOPERATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR NATIONAL
REGULATORS*
DIANE WOOD**
My remarks are going to take us back to the question of competi-
tion policy, or antitrust more particularly, and I would like to try to
place that in some kind of broader institutional setting. This certainly
is a subject that is generally important to the way that international
trade works, and to the way that international economic regulation is
working, because we want markets to be responsive to supply and de-
mand factors. We are interested in serving the ultimate welfare of
consumers around the world, and it is not surprising that the question
of the appropriate international dimension for competition policy has
become debated more and more actively as we make progress with
the various governmental barriers to trade.
I would like to stress that we have been discussing a number of
dimensions of competition policy and, as Claus Ehlermann said yes-
terday, we have on the one hand, various governmental measures of
many different kinds, such as subsidies, licensing standards, tariffs, and
quotas, and on the other hand, we have other measures which private
firms may employ. They may cartelize and fix prices or allocate mar-
kets; they may decide to merge and create a structural change in the
market that might make them a dominant player in the market; they
might (if they have a very large share of the market) engage in a
whole host of practices, whether boycotts, various kinds of vertical
restrictions, distributional restrictions, tying arrangements and the
like. Many of those kinds of practices have nothing to do directly with
what the governments have put into place, and those are the tradi-
tional subjects of antitrust law. So, the question that has concerned us
most of all is whether that second group of practices needs to be ad-
dressed at the international level, or whether the international con-
cerns that we have will continue to be addressed best at the national
level, perhaps with some changes, both in national laws and in the way
that different national systems work together.
* Adapted from a lecture delivered by Judge Wood on October 6, 1995 at the Chicago-
Kent College of Law.
** Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The views expressed in this
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That is the perspective I would like to take here. I am not going
to be talking about the desirability of international measures to re-
duce governmental barriers to competition, because I am happy to see
measures, anywhere they may appear, that will reduce governmental
barriers to competition. In my opinion, one of the events that got this
debate moving as vigorously as it has been moving, goes back to the
structural impediments initiative talks that took place between the
United States and Japan, in the administration before the one that I
was fortunate enough to serve in. People started saying, "Well, if
there are access barriers to the Japanese market," and I am only using
this example because it was what happened, "how can we overcome
these barriers, how can individual firms find their way into Japan?"
The thought was that better enforcement of the antimonopoly law of
Japan might be the answer. Japan does, after all, have a law that ad-
dresses the very same subject that U.S. antitrust law addresses. Per-
haps if refusals to deal, keeping firms out of markets, or other kinds of
anticompetitive practices exist, this is a way of addressing those barri-
ers effectively.
I do not think you could challenge the proposition that better
enforcement of competition laws will sometimes have a market-open-
ing effect, but I have a problem with taking this too much further. At
its heart, at least in the United States, antitrust law is a law which
focuses on the prices and choices available to consumers-final con-
sumers or anybody who is a buyer. From that perspective, it does not
really matter who is serving the consumer. It does not matter if it is a
foreign firm, it does not matter if it is a domestic firm, and the size of
the market does not matter either. For example, for my weekly gro-
cery shopping, I would not dream of going beyond probably about a
five mile radius from my home. It does not really matter to me too
much that there might be a grocery store available in Frankfurt that I
could go to. I am not going to go to Frankfurt to buy my groceries.
For the consumer, therefore, groceries are found in a local market. Or
if there is a highway construction operator, as I was unfortunate
enough to run into driving in this morning on the highway, who is
ripping up the road, he is not going to buy his concrete from just any-
body. He will go to someone within a fairly narrow area. It is just not
that kind of product. There are many things for which markets are
very local and some for which markets are national. We must always
ask who is out there who can serve this market?
This takes me for just a second back to the Kodak-Fuji dispute. I
think we always have to think about markets from the point of view of
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the consumer who is interested in buying the product. If the market is
in fact quite open because of the lack of government barriers, because
of ease of transportation, because of ready substitutability of products,
and openness to products offered from all over the world, then in that
sense and for that consumer, there is a world market. Another con-
sumer in another country might not be looking at a world market. For
instance, a consumer in a country that has a very bad transportation
system or where some set of local needs means that the other manu-
factured products are not particularly good substitutes, or in a country
that, perhaps in violation of its GATT obligations, maintains technical
barriers to trade that make it impossible for those products to enter it,
may have choices available only from a smaller set of suppliers. In
short, this is a very consumer-oriented subject. If we then try to marry
it to the idea of market access, there is only an imperfect fit. The fit is
imperfect because the market-access concern of the trade community
has been much more focused on the opportunities available to sellers
in the market. Which set of consumers will they be able to reach?
This is plainly important, but something which, at least from the per-
spective of U.S. antitrust law, is only an incidental consequence of the
way antitrust law operates.
We tell firms that they cannot cartelize. We tell firms that they
are entitled to choose their customers and that they may sell or not to
any given buyer as they wish, as long as they are engaging in that
decision-making process independently. That is our Colgate doctrine,
which is a very important part of U.S. antitrust law. Our laws have a
very strong bias against dictating to individual firms what kind of busi-
ness practices they should engage in, because we recognize that indi-
vidual firms would like to take business away from other firms. Put
differently, they would like to exclude other firms from the market.
When you look at the subject of exclusionary conduct, you find that
there are great difficulties in distinguishing between forms of exclu-
sionary conduct that are simply normal competition and the much
smaller set of exclusionary conduct practices which are anticompeti-
tive. We normally associate the latter with firms that have very sub-
stantial degrees of market power. In the United States, more market
power is needed than would be called for, for instance, in Article 86.
Markets are defined somewhat broadly, and we look for more power.
Where does this take me in terms of our institutional structures?
For a couple of reasons, including the consumer focus of antitrust law
and the differing cultural perspectives that still exist today, this is a
body of law that, at the moment, is best kept at the national level. I
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have a paper which is going to be published in a volume from a con-
ference that was held in May 1995 in Washington, in which I elaborate
on this somewhat more extensively. There are a number of arguments
for and against taking this to the international level, even in the op-
tional way that the proposed plurilateral Munich code did. We should
ask a number of questions. Which kind of rules will produce the most
efficient results from the point of view of the cost of regulation on the
one hand, and from the point of view of just simply finding efficient
behaviors deterring competitively bad behaviors? We should ask,
"What is most acceptable from a cultural standpoint or a social stand-
point?" We have already touched on, the important question, "What
will enjoy the greatest degree of political legitimacy within the regulat-
ing country?" We should ask, "What is the best from the standpoint
of diplomatic or international relations?" One's decision on either a
national or international level for Competition Law enforcement is
going to vary, a little bit, depending on which one of these questions
we are asking.
My argument is that national regulation coupled with appropriate
modifications in the direction of bilateral relationships, or eventually
perhaps, networks of relationships, is the best approach. Let me just
run through the key factors very quickly: efficiency, transaction costs,
and underlying behaviors. The question of the efficiency of many na-
tional laws has often arisen. There is a law in Brussels, and all fifteen
member states now have some kind of competition law. There are
some fifty or sixty countries around the world with antitrust laws. 'Is
that not inefficient in and of itself? Should we not think of beginning
to internationalize this simply so that the authorities can work with
each other without duplicating all of their work? My answer to that
has been that the existence of many authorities does not itself make
the case for internationalization, because competition cases in the end
deal with competitive conditions in particular markets.
I was very influenced by this in the empirical study that Professor
Richard Whish and I undertook for the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development ("OECD") before I joined the gov-
ernment. We looked at mergers that had been investigated by more
than one authority, some as few as two or three and some as many as
fourteen, one potentially twenty. And, I walked into this expecting
that both the authorities and the private parties themselves would re-
port that it had been a real nuisance to have to have duplicative en-
forcement efforts. Quite to my astonishment, this is not what people
said. People said, well, yes, there were perhaps some additional costs
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some of the time, but only where the product was exactly the same
from market to market. This was frequently not the case because
many firms manufacture many different products, and the ones that
face a lot of competition in one market are not the same ones that
face a lot of competition in another market.
Just to give you an example, the Gillette-Wilkinson acquisition
eventually was stopped after some fourteen different authorities re-
viewed it. But, there we had a very simple product, razors and razor
blades, very common, which did not vary from one country to an-
other. So, the fact that people needed to go through all of these stages
was in fact a cost. Now, the company did not really seem to mind,
because things were going badly for it in some countries, and it was
hoping that perhaps in other countries it might be able to get its
merger through. There may have been a bit of self-interest in this
observation.
But, a case that came out quite differently was the joint venture
between Renault and Volvo. At the time, in the European market, the
greater concerns about that transaction had to do with automobiles,
because the kind of competition that took place among automobiles
for those two companies was very significant in Europe. This type of
rivalry was trivial in the United States, although the United States was
also a reviewing authority for that very same joint venture. Instead, in
the U.S. market, the problem was very large trucks of a kind that are
not even used in Europe-class seven and class eight commercial
trucks. For Canada and the United States, that was a very significant
aspect.
I give this as an example of why we found this a rather surprising
result about efficiency. The bottom line of both the companies and
the lawyers was, we have to make the case anyway for each individual
competitive setting which may happen to be a national market. It may
happen to be a continental market, or regional market, or many other
kinds of market, but it is not really going to save us much time in our
analysis of the competitive setting, whether we are preparing it for
one or several authorities. So you might find some savings in the bot-
tom line there, but probably not as much as you would perhaps ex-
pect, or as I initially expected.
On the procedural side, there are improvements that both can
and should be made, if one could actually achieve them. Common
timetables were the biggest thing people mentioned. The procedural
differences in the existing legal schemes make that rather difficult, just
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to take, for example, the merger regulation of the European Union
and the U.S. merger law. It is extremely difficult without imagining
legislative change on either side to imagine much progress on the
timetable issue. It is a completely different system of review in each
jurisdiction. Some transparency costs, in short, plainly exist on the
regulatory side.
The real efficiency concerns the question whether we must have
the same competition law. Do we, in fact, all need to decide whether
there will be a competition law focused only on efficiency? Whether
there will be a multigoal competition law where small and medium-
sized enterprises and their encouragement is part of it? Whether mar-
ket integration is part of it? Or whether unfair disloyal competition
concepts are part of it? Several models exist in today's world, and I
think that each model is perfectly explainable in the context from
which it arose.
It is easy enough to see why market integration is not a particular
concern of the U.S. antitrust law. The law came along one hundred
years after the Commerce Clause was already part of the Constitution.
The market was integrated and the rest of the market integration that
we achieved took place though the vehicle of Commerce Clause deci-
sions at the constitutional level, from the Supreme Court. To put it
very briefly, the Commerce Clause prohibits any state measure that
discriminates against interstate commerce. So, if the state of Missis-
sippi decides that the only milk you can buy in Mississippi stores has
to come from Mississippi cows, and they will not let in milk from Ala-
bama cows, that is unconstitutional. And indeed, there are all sorts of
contexts ranging from garbage, to mud flaps on trucks, to other things
where discrimination against interstate commerce has been struck
down. Going beyond that, the states are not permitted to enact legis-
lation that is facially neutral but which burdens interstate commerce.
This is often referred to as the dormant commerce clause. Even if
Congress has not spoken, there are some things that are so inimicable
to an open market in the country, that the states are forbidden to
intervene.
We have simply chosen a different legal vehicle for achieving the
market integration goal, and antitrust law plays little or no part in it.
Thus, we do not really care if somebody decides to assign distribution
territories and give an exclusive territory of Illinois to somebody and
an exclusive territory of Wisconsin to somebody else. They can do
that if they are not a dominant firm and if they are not, in some ex-
traordinary way, preventing competition. In Europe, an exclusive
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territory that was air-tight with France, and the same kind of exclusive
territory for Germany, would at a minimum raise much greater con-
cerns. But, this simply illustrates that the laws are different and they
come from different traditions. This is where, it seems to me, we have
to move onto some of the other concerns.
The social and cultural factors are extremely important for effec-
tive antitrust enforcement. This is because you need to have public
support for a law that tells businesses what they can do and when they
can do it. If you have a law that says, for example, that a merger will
go forward and the people in the local community know that that
merger means that the local plant is going to shut down, and thirty
percent of the community will now lose their jobs, somebody must be
supporting that law. You must have a law that people accept if it pro-
hibits, for example, the American Bar Association from telling law
schools how they should handle their accreditation procedures. There
are many other kinds of cases. Some people thought the Antitrust
Division should not have been pursuing a case against Microsoft.
Other people thought the Division should have taken more vigorous
steps against Microsoft. These are measures which have tremendous
impact on people, and so, I think if you try to put in place an antitrust
law or a competition law that does not have the fundamental support
of the business community and of the society more generally, you are
going to have a law that does not get enforced.
For a long time, this undoubtedly explained part of the history of
the enforcement, or lack thereof, of the law in Japan. People were
simply organizing their society in a somewhat different way. They
were not particularly convinced that going after the keiretsu, or the
other kinds of practices that may have seemed to be possible viola-
tions of the law was desirable. Things have turned around quite a bit
since SII and other similar revisits of the law that have taken place in
Japan. Enforcement has been increasing significantly. In other coun-
tries that have adopted antitrust laws, it has been adopted more
enthusiastically.
There is also an issue of the political legitimacy, and here I do
worry very much about who is finally going to decide that a particular
cartel has violated the laws, bearing in mind, that in the United States
you are talking about criminal law enforcement. You are talking
about somebody spending a couple of years of his life in jail, if it is an
individual, and you are talking about firms being criminally disbarred
from serving as government contractors and paying very large fines.
International review of criminal law enforcement is a pretty big step
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to take. Even if you assumed it was not criminal, you would still have
the question of international oversight of very particular decisions: in-
ternational oversight of, let us say, the Federal Trade Commission's
decision to allow the General Motors/Toyota joint venture to go for-
ward; international oversight, potentially, of both the European and
the American decision to require Microsoft to open up its operating
systems, and not to charge on a per processor basis, but instead to
charge original equipment manufacturers of computers only for com-
puters that actually had the Microsoft operating system on it. Maybe
that was a terrible thing to do, who knows? Somebody would have to
look at the record that we had to know whether it was a good or a bad
thing, and if those people themselves are not politically accountable, it
is a very delicate matter.
There are a couple of things that people do not like to talk about
very much, but they are worth exploring. What lies behind this push?
One of the things that continues to lie behind the push for internation-
alization has been a sense that there is still too much unilateral action,
particularly by the United States, but perhaps by other countries in-
creasingly as well. Unilateral action, when you really mean something
like 301, the In re World Arrangements Oil Cartel case, or the Ura-
nium cartel case, undoubtedly raises diplomatic tensions. The record
is very clear that this has happened. And there is no question about
the historical existence of a problem. The question that I ask myself
is, "What's the cure for this?" I think that the cure, if we look care-
fully, has been underway now for many years, and, with one addition,
would be just about finished. The cure has really been to do the same
thing that our Securities and Exchange Commission did, which is to
back off and say wait a minute. Rather than trying to barge around
the world, unilaterally enforcing our law, unilaterally trying to grab
evidence in other countries, pushing remedies on people that they do
not want, let us try cooperating with other authorities. Let us try
working with other people to the extent they have laws that are the
same.
And lo and behold, it turns out that there are a great number of
commonalities among the laws. To move from unilateral orientation
of mind to a cooperative orientation of mind, changes the entire pic-
ture, because just to say it is national enforcement does not mean it is
unilateral enforcement. National enforcement with the assistance of
and cooperation of other national authorities is something which has
happened for many years. No one talked about extraterritorial juris-
diction when the Department of Justice and the Canadian Bureau of
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Competition Policy jointly prosecuted the fax paper cartel. This was a
joint prosecution under the authority of a treaty, so in terms of legal
basis, everything was fine. It involved joint interviews with officials
from each authority, a joint database, joint analysis, and each side de-
ciding what steps should be taken. The U.S. authorities took care of
our market, and the Canadians handled the Canadian market. There
are various differences that flow from the differences between the two
laws, but on the whole and by and large, it was an extremely successful
effort at addressing a problem that was affecting both of our markets.
The same was true with Microsoft, where we had the advantage
of dealing with only a single firm, and the possibilities of bargaining
are very good when it is a single firm. In cartel cases, it will be diffi-
cult to convince the cartel members to give their permission to allow
the authorities to jointly investigate them. So, we need better legal
measures like the treaty that we have with Canada. But when you
have that possibility of cooperation, no issues of extraterritoriality are
likely to arise. Instead, the authorities will work things out, if one side
thinks that it ought to do more and the other side objects. The con-
versation can take place in a concrete setting. The conversation can
take place with full awareness of the relevant facts. I am certain that
that is a strategy that would work in the overwhelming majority of
cases.
Even when we have agreements with countries that do not permit
the sharing of confidential information, such as our 1982 agreement
with Australia, our former 1984 agreement with the Canadians with
respect to civil cases, our new 1995 agreement with the Canadians,
and our 1976 agreement with Germany, "soft" cooperation tends to
reduce the incidence of jurisdictional disputes. Our agreement with
the Europeans, now reinstated, is another case in point. The coopera-
tive presumption exists there, and we have not had extraterritorial
problems that have been insurmountable. There have been a few
glitches I can think of, but on the whole, they have all been worked
out. So, from the international relations point of view given the par-
ticularized nature of every competition case, it is not useful to worry
about international cooperation when each case that is going to come
up is going to involve particular other countries. Indeed this has hap-
pened as well, in spite of all the sound and fury that sometimes gets
the press' attention with respect to our relationship with the Japanese
Fair Trade Commission, the U.S. authorities have now had eighteen
years of very harmonious bilateral consultations with that agency. Ju-
dicial assistance tools are available under the laws of many countries
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that are sometimes used. Where they are available, they can work
effectively, in a manner targeted for the needs of the case at hand.
My last comment about this-aside from a plug for everyone to
sign up with the United States for the new bilateral information-shar-
ing antitrust mutual assistance agreements that the Department of
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission are now authorized to con-
clude-is before we reach the international stage let us see how well
we can do at the level of transnational cooperation. We are still going
to need to do this anyway, even if there is an international code. So,
why do we not try this one out and see if this maybe does solve most
of the problems without creating yet another layer of bureaucracy.
Finally let me make one comment on export cartels. This is my
private unconventional idea, which I do not really suggest entirely se-
riously. I am not so worried about export cartels. This is because con-
sumer welfare underlies antitrust law, and I think that the optimal
enforcer for any competition case is the country whose consumers are
harmed by the particular practice in question. Very often, that will be
the same country as the country where the doers of the harm are lo-
cated. Sometimes it will be foreign companies who are inflicting
harm on domestic consumers.
Sometimes in Europe it will be U.S. companies who are inflicting
harm on European consumers. If those U.S. companies, as was the
case in the wood pulp cartel, happen to have a Webb-Pomerene ex-
emption from U.S. antitrust law, it seems to me that all U.S. law says
is they are not really doing anything in the United States that is hurt-
ing the U.S. market. The 1975 antitrust international guidelines un-
derscore that a Webb-Pomerene exemption does not mean you have
immunity under foreign law. The U.S. authorities have no power to
grant any such immunity. In light of that fact, my notion has been,
that if you were going to do anything, what you should do in those
cases is stand ready to provide assistance under the appropriate legal
authorizations to the foreign authorities so that their consumers can
be protected. You could then leave all the export cartel exemptions in
place, if you made it very clear that those kinds of arrangements are
undertaken at the firms' own risk. And, if they are in fact violating
the law of the country into which they are sending their exports, they
had better watch out, because they are not going to get a sympathetic
hearing on any side. This will also help to separate true export cartels
from legitimate joint ventures. Webb-Pomerene Associations fre-
quently are nothing more than joint ventures. Just because a couple
of companies have gotten together to create a joint selling arrange-
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ment by no means proves that they actually have "cartelized." Maybe
they are just sharing facilities and creating some sort of efficient ar-
rangement. So the mere existence of one of these export associations
normally is not enough to know whether they are creating any kind of
competitive problem or not in the other market.
The bottom line is that competition is important. It is something
that needs to be fostered and encouraged in as many places as possi-
ble. But this process has to unfold from the ground up. The way to do
that is to have effective national laws that are consumer-oriented, and
to allow the national authorities to work with each other.

